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to Dark, Cold Neutron Star: 
NUMBER 1 
The Early Life, the Explosion 
and the Collapse of Arbitration 
Michael Hunter Schwartz• 
INTRODUCTION 
The brightest stars in the sky are both hotter and larger than other stars 1 
and they bum more intensely and therefore exhaust their nuclear fuel much 
faster.2 The exhaustion of fuel causes the star to explode, thereby creating 
what astronomers call a "supernova," a phenomenon which is as much as 100 
billion times brighter than the average star.3 At the end of the supernova's 
short existence, the star partially collapses and becomes a neutron star, which 
is an extremely dense, cold star.4 Thus, the very forces that make these stars 
• Assistant Professor of Law, Western State University College of Law. A.B., 1984, University of 
California, Berkeley; J.D., 1987, Hastings College of the Law. 
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Zepfel for his funny, helpful comments on an earlier draft. My colleague, Leslie Dery, and the editor-in-
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support of this and all of my other endeavors. Special thanks and gratitude are due my colleague, Susan 
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I. ALAN LIGIITMAN, TiME FOR THE STARS: ASTRONOMY IN THE 1990s, 32· 34 ( 1992). 
2. /d. at 35. The brightest stars also are bluer in color than other stars, reflecting the greater heat 
produced by burning nuclear fuel so quickly. /d. at 34. 
3. /d. at 40-41. 
4. /d. at 35, 41. Some neutron stars, those with the greatest mass, completely collapse on themselves 
and end up as "black holes," invisible holes in space. /d. at 41. 
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brighter and, therefore, more attractive to us also cause them to explode and 
collapse. 
In this article, I argue that binding arbitration,5 a prominent form of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR"),6 is such a star, destined to bum out 
and collapse on itself and become a dim part of ADR.7 
Arbitration has existed in America since before the inception of the 
United States.8 Nevertheless, for most of its history in the United States, 
arbitration has been held in contempt by the courts and the legal profession.9 
In Part I of this article, I review the history of arbitration up to the explosion 
of arbitration in the mid- to late twentieth century. 
Recently, criticism of courtroom adjudication10 has drastically increased. 11 
Critics assert that adjudication is slow, expensive, and rigid at the expense of 
being just. They also argue that adjudication unwisely persists in trying to 
address disputes in specialized areas which are beyond its competence, and that 
adjudication polarizes parties by dividing them into winners and losers. 12 
In what appears to be an attempt to respond to some of these criticisms, 
the bar, the judiciary and academics have begun to advocate the increased use 
of all forms of ADR. This increase in advocacy of ADR has been dubbed the 
"ADR Movement."13 In addition, the actual use of all forms of ADR, and, in 
particular, of arbitration, has greatly increased. 14 Advocates hail arbitration as 
5. The tenns "arbitration" and "binding arbitration" will be used in this article interchangeably to refer 
only to out-of-court hearings in which one or more independent persons, the arbitrator(s), decide who wins 
and what is won, and that result is, as a practical matter, final. DAVID MELLINKOFF, MELLINKOFF's 
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE 33 (1992). Non-binding arbitration is the same as binding 
arbitration except that either party to a non-binding arbitration has the option to reject the arbitrator's 
decision and obtain a trial de novo. /d. This article does not address non-binding arbitration. Another 
distinction often made in articles addressing arbitration is between contractual or voluntary arbitration, on 
the one hand, and court-ordered arbitration, which is also known as court-annexed arbitration, on the other. 
The former requires an agreement between the parties to arbitrate their dispute whereas the latter occurs 
when a court orders the parties to arbitrate. This article does not distinguish between binding voluntary and 
court-annexed arbitration because the issues identified apply to all forms of binding arbitration. 
6. The term ADR will be used in this article in a broad sense to refer to any method of resolving a 
legal dispute that does not involve a trial in a court established by a state or federal government. /d. at 16. 
ADR includes, among other things, arbitration, mediation, and mini-trials. /d. 
7. This article does not address the efficacy of other forms of ADR. For argument~ that mediation also 
has deficiencies, especially for women, see Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for 
Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991); Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the 
Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992). 
8. See infra note 20 and accompanying text. 
9. See i~fra notes 28-49 and accompanying text. 
I 0. Throughout this article the term "adjudication" will be used to refer to trial in a state or federal 
courtroom where either a jury or judge is the trier of fact. 
II. See infra notes 55 - 61 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 62- 69 and accompanying text. 
13. See, e.g., Kenneth Penegar, Preface: The Elusive Promise of Legal Reform, 46 SMUL. REV. 1889, 
1890 (1993) (arguing that the "ADR Movement" is the most significant change in the legal system in the 
twentieth century). 
14. See infra notes 50- 54 and accompanying text. 
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one of the brightest forms of dispute resolution. 15 They argue that arbitration 
is a faster, cheaper and perhaps even better form of dispute resolution than 
adjudication. 16 I see this expansion phase in the history of arbitration as the 
supernova of arbitration, the time when arbitration has generated the most 
excitement. In Part ll of this article I trace the rise of arbitration and examine 
its asserted benefits. 
The very qualities that make arbitration seem attractive, however, are also 
the qualities that will cause it, at least as an important and often-used form of 
dispute resolution, to collapse. In fact, identification of possible instabilities 
in the arbitration star have already been made. 17 In Part Ill of this article, I 
describe the problems which have been identified, detail additional problems 
and argue that the problems derive from the very attributes of arbitration that 
have been lauded. In Part IV, I describe possible solutions to the problems. 
Finally, in Part V of this article, I elucidate my thesis that addressing the 
problems of arbitration will cause it to collapse. I argue that the proposed 
solutions will fail on three different levels. First, some of the deficiencies of 
arbitration cannot be remedied. Second, the solutions for arbitration's ills 
necessarily will involve adapting procedures from adjudication to arbitration; 
such adaptation will prove difficult to tailor to the arbitration form and difficult 
to implement. Finally, attempts to save arbitration will make arbitration so 
much like court trials that the qualities that have made arbitration attractive 
will be lost. 
Arbitration will be squeezed between the pressure to expand, in response 
to society's concerns regarding court trials, and the pressure to improve, which 
requires making arbitration more like adjudication. If the only way to save 
arbitration is to make it like adjudication, and if, even then, we really cannot 
cure arbitration's deficiencies, arbitration must collapse on itself. Like a 
supernova which is compressed by the extraordinary pressure of gravity into 
a cold, dark, neutron star, arbitration cannot survive the pressures inherent in 
its nature. Eventually, arbitration must cease being an important part of the 
ADR Movement. 
15. See Jethro K. Liebennan and James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, (1986); Jane B. Kom, Changing Our Perspective on Arbitration: A 
Traditional and a Feminist View, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 67 (1991); Alan S. Rau, Resolving Disputes Over 
Attorneys' Fees: The Role of ADR, 46 SMU L. REV. 2005 (1993). 
16. See, e.g., Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration 
Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 255 (1987). 
17. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359 ( 1985); Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality 
of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TuL. L. REv. 1 (1987); Richard Reuben, The Dark Side of ADR, CAL. 
LAw., (Feb. 1994, at 53). 
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I. THE HISTORY OF ARBITRATION 
From Colonial Times to the Twentieth Century 
Concerns regarding problems with the speed, cost, capacity, and 
flexibility of adjudication, which, in recent years, have spawned the ADR 
movement, 18 were first raised when arbitration came to the New World. 
Arbitration has been traced as far back as thirteenth century England. 19 
Along with its legal system, England exported arbitration, pretty much in its 
current form, to its American colonies.20 The colonists' distrust of the law and 
desire for social harmony caused them to seek means other than adjudication 
to resolve disputes.21 
By the mid-eighteenth century, the colonial merchants had come to 
perceive a conflict between judicial settlement of disputes and their need for 
privacy and cooperation. 22 They therefore developed their own private 
tribunals using merchant decision-makers. In fact, one of the reasons the 
merchants formed the New York Chamber of Commerce was their desire to 
organize arbitration of disputes.23 
At the same time, the eighteenth century saw a great rise in preference for 
adjudication as a means of dispute resolution. As a result, adjudication became 
the overwhelming norm for dispute resolution.24 This preference is reflected 
in the United States Constitution, in which the legal system is given co-equal 
status with the executive and legislative branches of government. 25 
The nineteenth century included periods of minor rises in the popularity 
of arbitration. The conflicts between the former slaves and former slave 
owners often were resolved in "Freedman's Tribunals," which, in practice, 
appear to have been a means for reenforcing white power and white suprema-
cist views.26 Arbitration also was championed in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century as a means of calming labor tensions. 27 The judiciary, 
however, was overtly hostile to and distrustful of arbitration.28 
18. See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text. 
19. Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 854 (1961). 
20. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOlJT LAW? 4, 20 (1983). For example, arbitration is explicitly 
identified as a preferred means of dispute resolution in a 1635 Boston ordinance. /d. at 23. 
21. /d. at 19-20. 
22. /d. at 33. 
23. Mentschikoff, supra note 19, at 855. 
24. AUERBACH, .fupra note 20, at 41. 
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (New American Library 1961). 
26. AUERBACH, supra note 20, at 59. 
27. /d. at 62. 
28. See Kanowitz, supra note 16, at 254. 
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The Early and Mid-Twentieth Century History of Arbitration 
The twentieth century has seen the increased legalization of arbitration; 
it has moved away from its historical a-legal approach and status and has 
become more law-bound and law-govemed.29 In 1920, for example, New 
York enacted the first pro-arbitration statute, which provided that errors of law 
by an arbitrator were not grounds for setting aside an arbitration award,30 and 
that agreements to arbitrate could not be revoked.31 Until very recently, 
however, the courts continued to regard arbitration with considerable disdain. 
Insight into this disdain can be gained from examining how early mid-
twentieth century courts discussed arbitration.32 A 1918 California Supreme 
Court opinion declared that an arbitration clause is "void as an attempted 
interference with the power and jurisdiction of the courts to decide controver-
sies between parties to contracts."33 The suggestion that arbitration interferes 
with the "power" and "jurisdiction" of the legal system suggests a belief that 
arbitration posed a competitive threat to the legal system. 
The use of the word "void" is also significant. It suggests that an 
arbitration clause is not merely undesirable but is, in fact, so repugnant that it 
should be deemed never to have existed at all. Arbitration clauses, of course, 
are simply contract terms. In contract law, the use of the term "void" typically 
is used only for illegal contracts, such as a promise to kill someone in 
exchange for money. Because killing is a crime, the courts hold that such a 
promise is "void."34 Here, the word "void" means that the promises do not 
create any obligation. 
In contrast, contracts with persons who lack the capacity to contract, such 
as minors, and contracts entered into on the basis of mistake or even fraud are 
described as "voidable."35 Even many illegal bargains are designated merely 
as "unenforceable," rather than as void. 36 Thus, the use of the word "void" 
29. AUERBACH, supra note 20, at 110-11. 
30. Menl~chikoff, supra note 19, at 856. 
31. AUERBACH, supra note 20, at 104. 
32. In several places in this article, the language used by courts in discussing arbitration is examined 
in an attempt to gain insight into how the legal system viewed arbitration. This close textual analysis stems 
from a belief that an author's (or judge's) views may be revealed in the tone and structure of what she writes 
even if she was not consciously aware of those views. This practice is commonly employed in other fields, 
such as literary criticism. See, e.g., D. W. HARDING, Regulated Hatred: An Aspect of the Work of Jane 
Austin, in 20TH CENTURY LITERARY CRmCISM: A READER 263 (D. Lodge ed., 1972) (arguing that, contrary 
to appearances, Jane Austin's work contains evidence that she greatly disliked the society depicted in her 
novels). The application of techniques of literary criticism to legal opinions is justified by the fact that, 
"Judges ... resemble literary artists in the close artention they pay to the choice of words in which to 
express themselves .... " RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, 8 (1988). 
33. North American Co. v. Outer Harbor Co., 178 Cal. 406,413, 173 P. 756, 759 (1918). 
34. JOHN D. CALAMARI AND JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS, §§ 1-11, at 18 (West 3d ed., 1987). 
35. /d. at 19. 
36. /d. 
6 WESTERN STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [22:1 
expresses legal conclusions of illegality and non-recognition and reflects a very 
strong judicial antipathy for arbitration. 
This antipathy existed even in New York where arbitration was first given 
statutory recognition as an enforceable contractual promise. In re Friedman,31 
which was decided six years after the enactment of the New York's pro-
arbitration statute, express a large measure of fear and distrust of arbitration. 
Friedman addressed the seemingly simple question of whether an arbitrator's 
decision could be enforced where the arbitrator received a substantial loan 
from one of the litigants during the pendency of the arbitration.38 The 
Friedman court held that the decision should not be enforced. 39 What is 
striking is the court's explanation of some of the reasons for its decision. The 
court stated: 
During recent years arbitration has been more and more resorted to for the 
settlement of business controversies. It therefore becomes of the utmost 
importance that .. . where the rights of parties are adjudicated, not by 
trained lawyers and judges, but by fellow business men, every safeguard 
possible should be thrown about the proceeding .... 40 
The court's perception of a need for extra safeguards suggests some 
distrust of arbitrators and arbitration. This distrust is more clearly manifested 
in how, and by what language, the court juxtaposes the legal system with 
arbitration. The court chooses the word "trained" to describe lawyers and 
judges, who, the court emphasizes, will not be deciding the case. The court 
states that, instead, the case will be decided by businessmen arbitrators. The 
only adjective used to describe the arbitrators is the word "fellow." The use 
of the word "fellow" to modify businessmen, especially given its context, in 
a parallel structure comparing arbitrators to the "trained lawyers and judges," 
seems both to suggest that businessmen are not qualified and to reflect a belief 
that there may be some sort of collusion (fellowship) among these businessmen 
in arbitrating rather than adjudicating each other's disputes. 
Equally revealing is the court's unusual choice in words for the sugges-
tion that more protection is needed for arbitration. The court tells us that 
safeguards need to be "thrown about" the arbitration proceeding. The physical 
image of safeguards being thrown about a proceeding reflects tremendous fear 
of arbitration. It suggests that the court views arbitrations as being haphazard, 
rather than reasoned and controlled. It also suggests that arbitration is so out 
of control that extra safeguards are needed for arbitration because some of the 
safeguards may miss their targets and, therefore, fail to protect the parties. 
37. 213 N.Y.S. 369 (1926). 
38. /d. at 375. 
39. /d. 
40. ld. at 375-76 (emphasis added). 
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Because I believe that safeguards are more typically "adopted" or perhaps 
"utilized" or "applied," I see this language as reflecting a fundamental distrust 
of arbitration as a method of dispute resolution. 
A few years later, Congress followed New York's lead in making 
arbitration agreements irrevocable by enacting the Federal Arbitration Act.41 
The first Uniform Arbitration Act was approved by the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association 
in 1955.42 A 1953 Supreme Court opinion makes it clear, however, that 
considerable judicial distrust of arbitration continued through the mid-
twentieth century. 
Wilco v. Swan43 involved a question regarding the ability to arbitrate a 
claim for damages under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.44 The 
parties' contract contained an express arbitration clause.45 When the plaintiff 
sued in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, the defendant 
moved to stay the action pending arbitration of the plaintiff's claims in 
accordance with the contractual arbitration clause.46 
The plaintiff challenged the stay, arguing that the arbitration clause 
constituted a waiver of the Securities Act's explicit grant of a right to sue in 
federal court, and that any waiver of a right conferred by the Act is "void.'147 
The Supreme Court agreed.48 While the holding itself seems to reflect a strong 
distrust of arbitration, the Court's explanation of the reasons for its decision 
leaves no doubt that the Court disliked arbitration: 
This case requires subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an 
alleged violator of the Act. They must be not only determined but applied 
by the arbitrators without judicial instruction on the law. As their award 
may be made without explanation of their reasons and without a complete 
record ... the arbitrators' conception of the legal meaning of such statutory 
requirements as "burden of proof," "reasonable care" or "material fact," 
... cannot be examined.49 
The Court's concern regarding the "arbitrators' conception" of relatively 
easy legal concepts such as "burden of proof' and "material fact" suggests that 
the Supreme Court believed that arbitrators cannot handle even relatively 
simple legal issues. The Court also focused on what it perceived to be missing 
41. 9 U .S.C. § I et seq. (1947). 
42. Unif. Arbitration Act, 7 U .L.A. 5 (1955). 
43. 346 U.S. 427 (1953) overruled by de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 
(1989). 
44. /d. at 428. 
45. /d. at 429. 
46. /d. 
47. /d. at 430. 
48. /d. at 434-35. 
49. /d. at 435-36. 
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in arbitration, a focus which is reflected in the Court's repeated use of the word 
"without." Although Congress appeared to have developed confidence in 
arbitration by 1953, the Court was not yet ready to concur. 
It was not until fairly recently that the pressure on the legal system 
became so great that ADR became an institution in itself, revered not only by 
the public, but also by judges, lawyers, and law professors. 
II. THE EXPLOSION OF ARBITRATION 
Arbitration in the Late Twentieth Century 
In the past few years there has been dramatic change in the legal commu-
nity's attitude towards arbitration. Arbitration has changed from being 
relatively unused and disdained to being a popular, oft-championed form of 
dispute resolution. Arbitration of disputes has exploded; binding arbitration 
clauses are being written into a greatly increasing number of contracts50 in a 
wide variety of contexts, from employment contracts to construction and real 
estate contracts, and from insurance contracts to securities contracts.51 Even 
the morning cereal is not immune; General Mills recently announced that its 
Honey Nut Cheerios cereal boxes now will include arbitration clauses for 
disputes arising out of General Mills' Sega game sweepstakes. 52 
Disputes therefore are being arbitrated in increasing numbers. For 
example, Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service, Inc. (JAMS) has grown 
by more than 2,300% in just the past six years.53 Commentators usually trace 
this change to an increase in dissatisfaction with courtroom dispute 
resolution, 54 the expression of which has also greatly increased in recent years. 
The Criticism of Adjudication 
The criticisms of adjudication can be divided into two categories: (a) 
criticisms of the efficiency of adjudication and (b) criticisms relating to the 
quality of adjudication. 
50. Reuben, supra note 17, at 54. 
51. /d. at 55. 
52. PAMELA SEBASTIAN, Business Bulletin: Breakfast of Arbitrators?, WALL ST. J., June 30, 1994, 
at I. 
53. Reuben, supra note 17, at 55. 
54. See AUERBACH, supra note 20, at 123; Reuben, supra note 17, at 54; BRUNET, supra note 17, at 
2-3; Kanowitz, supra note 16, at 255, 303. But see Louis J. Weber, Jr., Court-Referred ADR and the 
Lawyer-Mediator: In Service of Whom, 46 SMU L. REV. 2113 (1993) (arguing that the rise in attorney 
support of ADR stems from a self-interest in arbitrating or mediating the disputes for income). 
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Efficiency Criticisms. Citing the increased case load of the courts, 
commentators argue that the legal system is simply too slow. 55 At least some 
commentators, however, dispute the caseload statistics. These commentators 
contend that the statistics are inflated by the inclusion of undisputed matters 
such as name changes, uncontested divorces and the probate of wills. The 
filing of these matters, the commentators argue, has increased disproportion-
ately in recent years. 56 Even given the possibility of inflation, the increase in 
court filings is startling. More than two and a half times more cases were filed 
in 1980 than in 1934.57 Moreover, the time from filing to trial, at least in some 
areas, now is three years or longer.58 Experts predict that the situation 
probably will worsen in the future; filings are expected to triple in the next 
twenty-five years. 59 
Critics of adjudication also argue that the cost of adjudication has become 
so prohibitive that most people cannot afford to resolve their disputes in 
court. 60 For example, a partner with a national law firm regularly warns his 
clients that a typical commercial case requiring one week of trial probably will 
cost the client between $100,000 and $150,000. He also tells them that a 
number of his cases have not merely exceeded the $150,000 high-side estimate 
but actually have doubled it.61 
Quality Criticisms. Others have criticized the legal system for being 
disconnected from the real world. In other words, some critics question the 
ability of a rigid, rule-based system to resolve complicated disputes where 
conventional answers based on conventional notions of property and rights 
may be impossible.62 For example, traditional race and sex discrimination 
doctrine is flawed because it demarginalizes those who fall within the 
intersection of both, such as black women.63 Courts and commentators deny 
the compound nature of the experience of black women by treating them as 
being either too much like women to represent blacks or too much like blacks 
55. See, e.g., Judge Robert M. Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, "ADR" Techniques in the Refoi77Ullion Model 
of Civil Dispute Resolution, 46 SMU L. REV. 1905, 1907 (1993). 
56. See Brunet, supra note 17, at 5. 
57. Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 396 n.85 (1982-1983). 
58. Parker & Hagin, supra note 55, at 1908. 
59. /d. at 1909. 
60. /d. at 1906. 
61. Notes of June 21, 1994, telephone conversation on file with author. The name of the speaker and 
of his law finn have been withheld on request. It is my understanding that the billing rates of the law firm 
actually are lower than many of its competitors' rates. 
62. See Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and 
the Practice of Law, II N.Y.U. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369 (1982-83). 
63. Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 UNIV. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 139 (1989). 
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to represent women or by ignoring the intersection of both in cases involving 
black women. 64 • 
Commentators also argue that the legal system polarizes the parties by 
dividing them into winners and losers and thereby forfeits any possibility of a 
resolution that might preserve the parties' relationship. 65 The courts do not 
consider and, usually, cannot consider compromise or flexible solutions to the 
disputes before them. As a result, court trials may increase rather than soothe 
hostilities. 66 
Another criticism often articulated is that courts are forced to address 
disputes in specialized areas which are beyond their competence.67 Some 
argue that it is too "daunting" to a litigant or her68 attorney to have to educate 
a jury or judge about particular industry practices.69 
The Rise of Arbitration 
Although the connection between the increase of criticism of the legal 
system and the rise of arbitration as a popular means of dispute resolution is 
unclear, the drastic change in the legal system's and the public's attitude 
towards arbitration is unmistakable. Arbitration is praised by its proponents 
with almost evangelical fervor;70 even those who have been critical of some 
aspect of arbitration or ADR or who advocate avoiding arbitration or ADR 
under certain circumstances nevertheless hasten to communicate that they 
value arbitration as a means of dispute resolution.71 Arbitration has become 
politically correct. 
The language used by the courts in recent cases to discuss arbitration 
reflects this drastic change and stands in sharp contrast to the language found 
in earlier twentieth century cases like Wilco and Friedman. In Perini Corp. v. 
Great Bay Hotel & Casino, lnc.,12 the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that 
"judicial attitudes about arbitration have changed significantly" from 
"mistrust" to a "strong commitment to arbitration."73 More significantly, the 
court defined arbitration as "'a substitution, by consent of the parties, of 
64. /d. 
65. /d. at 2025 . See also Kom, supra note 15, at 102. 
66. Crenshaw, supra note 63, at 2025 . 
67. See, e.g., Rau, supra note 15, at 2029. 
68. In this article, I use only female gender pronouns where gender is neutral, much as, in traditional 
legal writing, only male gender pronouns are used. This choice stems from my belief that such 
juxtapositions of traditional forms have the potential for transforrnative power. For a discussion of the 
transfo1111lltive possibilities inherent in pornography, see Susan E. Keller, Review Essay: Justify My Love, 
18 W. ST. U. L. REv.'463 (1990). 
69. Rau, supra note 15, at 2029. 
70. See sources cited supra note 54. 
71. See, e.g., Delgado et al., supra note 17, at 1402; Brunet, supra note 17, at 56. 
72. 610 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1992). 
73. /d. at 369. 
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another tribunal for the tribunal provided by the ordinary process of law,' and 
its object is 'the final disposition, in a speedy, inexpensive, expeditious and 
perhaps less formal manner, of the controversial differences between the 
parties."'74 
The change in judicial attitude towards arbitration here is dramatic. 
While the Friedman court contrasted the "trained" decision-makers in 
adjudication with the "fellow businessmen" decision-makers in arbitration/5 
the Perini court uses the same word, "tribunal," to describe both adjudication 
and arbitration. To the Perini court, arbitration is simply a "substitution" of 
one equal for another. Likewise, although the Wilco court expressed doubt 
about the quality of arbitral justice,76 the Perini court details arbitration's 
virtues: "speedy, inexpensive, expeditious and perhaps less forrnal."77 
The Supreme Court also appears to have changed its opinion of 
arbitration drastically. In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 
/nc./8 the Supreme Court expressly overruled Wilco and held that a claim of 
a securities violation was arbitrable.79 In so holding, the Court contrasted what 
it called the "old judicial hostility to arbitration" with "our current strong 
endorsement of ... [arbitration]."80 This "strong endorsement" sharply 
contrasts with the Wilco court's criticisms of arbitration.81 
The Asserted Benefits of Arbitration 
Kenneth Penegar notes that the asserted benefits of arbitration can be 
divided into two categories, not unlike the two categories identified above with 
respect to the criticisms of courtroom dispute resolution. What Penegar calls 
the "cool" benefits of arbitration, greater speed and lower cost,82 correspond 
to the efficiency criticisms of adjudication; what Penegar calls the "warm" 
· benefits of arbitration, its greater flexibility, its ability to use "expert" decision 
makers, and its ability to make decisions that preserve relationships, 83 
correspond to the quality criticisms of adjudication. An additional "warm" 
benefit asserted for arbitration, which Penegar does not address and categorize, 
is that arbitration is private. 84 
74. /d. quoting Barcon Assoc. v. Tri-County Asphalt, 430 A.2d 214 (N.J. 1981). 
75. See In re Friedman, 213 N.Y.S. 369 (1926). 
76. See Wilco v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
77. Perini Corp. v. Great Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 610 A.2d 364, 369 (N.J. 1992). 
78. 490 u.s. 477 (1989). 
79. /d. at 480. 
80. /d. at 480-81. 
81. See supra notes 43 - 49 and accompanying text. 
82. Penegar, supra note 13, at 1892. 
83. /d. 
84. Mentschikoff, supra note 19, at 849; Rau, supra note 15, at 2029. 
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Analysis of "Cool" Benefits of Arbitration 
The "cool" benefits of arbitration, greater speed and lesser cost, are 
readily apparent and are not subjects of great dispute. Actually, the two 
benefits are intertwined; part of what makes arbitration cheaper is that it is 
faster. Arbitrations, on the average, are completed more quickly than 
adjudications. 85 The greater speed is attributable to the availability of more 
arbitrators than judges, the lack of discovery, and the informality of arbitration. 
Although the participants in arbitration must pay the fees of the decision-
maker, this expenditure is more than offset by savings in attorney's fees. 86 
This reduction in attorney's fees probably stems from a combination of factors. 
Arbitration is less formal. Arbitrators ignore evidentiary issues. Formal 
presentation of evidence is eschewed in favor of informal story-telling. 
Informality and the lack of evidentiary disputes save attorney time and effort, 
thereby reducing attorney fees. Arbitration also lacks formal pleading and 
discovery, which tend to extend the time until trial and result in the payment 
of substantial attorney fees. 
Analysis of the "Warm" Benefits of Arbitration 
Unless judicial involvement is sought either to confirm the arbitration 
award or to request judicial review of an arbitration award, arbitration occurs 
in private. It is much less clear that the other "warm" benefits attributed to 
arbitration, namely flexibility, relationship-preservation and expertise in the 
area of dispute, actually occur. 
Parties to arbitration sometimes do select an expert decision-maker. The 
existence of actual incarnations of the ideal arbitrator, a flexible, knowledge-
able, relationship-oriented decision-maker, never has been shown. Rather, 
arbitrators often are simply practicing or semi-retired attorneys or retired 
judges,87 and most arbitrators strive to follow the law. 88 Even an arbitrator who 
has expertise in the area of the dispute may not meet the asserted ideal. A lack 
of experience outside the arbitrator's area of expertise may produce decisions 
that have a pro-field bias or may limit the arbitrator's world-view so that it 
narrows her perception of the spectrum of resolution alternatives. 
85. See Rau, supra note 15, at 2027 n.83 (avemge time to completion of arbitmtion is a little over four 
months); Parker & Hagin, supra note 55, at 1908 (avemge time to completion of adjudication is 11.7 
months). 
86. Rau, supra note 15, at 2028-29. 
87. AUERBACH, supra note 20, at Ill. 
88. /d. at I 10-11. 
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III. THE DEFICIENCIES OF ARBITRATION 
In a sense, the vices of arbitration are its virtues. In the first part of this 
section, deficiencies are categorized as (1) process flaws, (2) symbolic or 
systemic flaws or (3) results flaws. If the deficiency arises out of arbitration's 
lack of formal procedures and codes of behavior, it is categorized as a process 
flaw. If the deficiency stems from the loss of the symbolic or systemic value 
of the courtroom process, it is categorized as a symbolic or systemic flaw. 
Finally, if the deficiency relates to the absolute finality given to arbitrator 
decisions, it is categorized as a results flaw. 89 
In the second part of this section, I connect the deficiencies to the benefits 
that engendered them. In so doing, I reveal the complicated relationships 
between the categories adopted in this section (process flaws, symbolic or 
systemic flaws and results flaws), on the one hand, and the asserted deficien-
cies of adjudication (efficiency and quality) and the asserted benefits of 
arbitration (warm and cool), on the other. 
Throughout this section, California arbitration law is used as the basis for 
analysis. California arbitration law is not unusual or unique in any of the areas 
discussed below. 
Identification and Analysis of Deficiencies 
Process Flaws 
Disclosure of Parties' Claims and Defenses. There is no statutory or 
judicial requirement that either party to an arbitration fully disclose the nature, 
extent and amount of either her claims or her defenses. The American 
Arbitration Association (''AAA"), the organization responsible for administer-
ing many arbitration claims throughout the United States, provides, upon 
request, claim forms which request information regarding the complaining 
party's complaints.90 Neither use of the forms nor any other method of claim 
disclosure is required either by statute or by court decision.91 The AAA forms 
themselves require only that a claimant disclose the nature of the claim. For 
89. Policy arguments on both sides of the issue are discussed in recognition of the indeterminacy of 
policy argument. See Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical 
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL Eouc. 518, 534-35 (1986). 
90. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION CLAIM FORM [hereinafter AAA 
FoRM]. The form allows the complaining party approximately one inch each for the party to state "The 
Nature of the Dispute" and "The Claim or Relief Sought." 
91. Neither California's arbitration statutes nor the Uniform Arbitration Act require disclosure of a 
party's claims at the pleading stage. 
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example, the claimant need only disclose that the claim is for "breach of 
contract," and the claimant is seeking "such damages as may appear to the 
arbitrator to be just and proper.'.n Thus, a property owner might present an 
arbitration claim to her general contractor for breach of contract without 
detailing the specific construction deficiencies or the amount she claims as 
damages. 
According to Jack Friedenthal, Mary Kay Kane and Arthur Miller, such 
disclosure is crucial to the just resolution of disputes; they argue that pleading 
requirements serve two important purposes. Pleading requirements ensure 
minimal disclosure by both parties, which assist the parties in preparing their 
strategies. These requirements also provide information to the court which 
facilitates the court's efforts in managing and helping to resolve the parties' 
claims.93 Other commentators argue that disclosure necessarily slows the 
speed of and increases the expense of dispute resolution. 94 Formal pleading 
and pleading disputes require attorney and court time, thereby increasing 
attorney fees. 
Exchange of Evidence. No discovery in any form is required by 
arbitration law. 95 The parties are left to their own imaginations with respect to 
case preparation. They therefore risk losing crucial evidence that may be 
available only from their opponents. As the Supreme Court explained in 
Hickman v. Taylor,96 the open discovery policy established by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure means that "civil trials ... need [not] be carried on 
in the dark."97 
In fact, there is no requirement, at least in a case involving $50,000 or 
less, that either party disclose the name and nature of any testimony to be given 
by any witness.98 This rule holds true for both percipient and expert witnesses. 
Consequently, neither party can anticipate nor respond to the other party's 
witnesses. 
The absence of disclosure, either by formal pleading or through 
discovery, of the nature, extent or amount of the claimant's complaints leaves 
disputants completely unable to allocate resources, negotiate settlement, or 
determine the need for their own expert witnesses. In short, plotting strategy 
in arbitrations is guesswork. 
92. See AAA FORM, supra note 90. 
93. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, 240 (2d ed., 1993). 
94. See. e g, Ran, wpm note 15.-at-2028~. ____ .:___ ____________ _ 
95. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 1283.05 (West 1994). 
96. 329 u.s. 495 (1947). 
97. /d. at 501. 
98. CAL. Clv. PRoc. CODE§ 1282.2 (West 1994). 
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Of course, if the parties are in a long-standing relationship, such 
guesswork, as a practical matter, may not be difficult. In any event, there is a 
consensus that attorneys and parties often abuse discovery in adjudication;99 
such abuse slows the time to trial and increases attorney fees. 100 
Evidentiary Limitations. The rules of evidence also do not apply to 
arbitrations. 101 Some argue that, as a whole, evidence rules are too abstract, 
too hierarchical and too adversarial, 102 and individual evidence rules are 
antiquated. Nevertheless, at least some evidentiary objections can be seen as 
salutary. 
For example, the hearsay objection103 reflects a distrust of statements 
made by a person who (a) was not present in court when the statement was 
made so that the trier of fact may judge her credibility, (b) is not subject to 
cross-examination, and (c) was not under oath when the statement was made 
so she had no legal compulsion to be truthful. 104 If a court is convinced that the 
hearsay evidence is credible, the court will admit it. 105 In arbitration, neither 
the policies underlying the hearsay rule nor its exceptions are entertained. 
Instead, untrustworthy hearsay evidence is regularly admitted. 
The various privileges, including the doctor-patient and spousal 
communications privileges, 106 arguably also have benefits worth considering. 
The privileges reflect a choice to forego the presentation of relevant evidence 
to protect personal privacy and to encourage frank, open and honest communi-
cation between doctor and patient or between spouses. 107 The prohibition 
against the use of settlement negotiations as evidence108 reflects the similar 
goal of encouraging frank and open settlement negotiations. 109 
The power of courts to exclude potentially relevant evidence where the 
value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the potential to unfairly 
prejudice the fact-finder110 reflects a different choice. The courts have 
99. See, e.g., FR1EDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 422. 
100. See Rau, supra note 15, at 2028. 
101. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 1282.2(d) (West 1994). 
102. Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 413 (1991). 
103. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE§§ 1200 et. seq. (West 1994). 
104. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,§ 245, at 93. (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). 
I 05. /d. § 324, at 363-64. Examples of where this policy has been applied by the legislature to 
conclude that such statements always are admissible include the exception to the hearsay rule for a statement 
made by a dying person regarding the cause of her death and a statement that is an ad'inission of 
wrongdoing. See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE§§ 1242, 1220 (West 1994). In both these situations, the court 
has reason to believe that the speaker is trustworthy. 
106. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE§§ 980,992 (West 1994). 
107. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 104, § 72 at 269-70. 
108. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE§ 1152 (West 1994). 
109. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 104, § 72.1 at 271. 
110. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE§ 352 (West 1994). 
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determined that the risk of prejudicing or misleading the fact-finder can be so 
significant that it may choose to withhold somewhat relevant evidence. 111 
The absence of these objections in arbitration raises the potential for a 
chilling effect on communications society wishes to encourage and a greater 
possibility that an arbitrator could be biased by learning highly prejudicial 
facts. 112 
The discovery deficiencies described above produce an interesting effect: 
arbitration has the potential to flip society's evidentiary aspirations. Because 
evidence cannot be obtained through discovery in arbitration, some evidence 
is not introduced that society probably would wish to be introduced. At the 
same time, because evidence cannot be barred by rules of evidence in an 
arbitration, some evidence is introduced that society probably would not wish 
to be introduced. 
Witness Honesty. Arbitration law does not require witnesses to testify 
under oath. 113 An oath requirement certainly does not ensure honesty by 
witnesses, however, the lack of an oath and the implicit threat of sanctions for 
perjury may encourage arbitration witnesses to lie. Criminal sanctions have 
some deterrent effect at least if the person who is contemplating a criminal act 
believes that she is very likely to be caught, convicted and punished. 114 
Because adjudication perjury occurs before a judge, who ostensibly has the 
power to punish the perjurer, the threat of punishment for perjury arguably has 
a deterrent effect. 
Selection, Qualifications and Integrity of Arbitrator. Several factors 
combine to make the process of arbitrator selection problematic. There are no 
legally required qualifications for one to be, or hold herself out as, an 
arbitrator. 115 Moreover, arbitrators do not swear an oath before performing 
their arbitral duties, 116 and arbitrators are not bound by any established ethical 
standards. 117 There is no formal review of complaints regarding arbitrators. 118 
Ill. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note I 04, § 185 at 780-81. 
112. The dangers of introducing inappropriately prejudicial facts may be even greater in an informal 
setting like arbitration than in a formal setting like adjudication. Bias is more likely in informal settings. 
See Delgado et al., supra note 17, at 1388-89. 
113. CAL C1v. PRoc. CODE§ 1282.2(d) (West 1994); Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal. 2d 515,520,212 
P.2d 233, 237 (1949). 
114. See Michael Davis, Book Review: Why Punish? by Nigel Walker, 12 L. & PHIL. 395 (1993). 
115. Robinson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 379, 387, 218 P.2d 10, 16 (1950). 
I 16. 6 CAL. )UR. § 36, at 7 7 (3d ed. 1994). 
117. Reuben, supra note 17, at 55. Rueben also notes that arbitrators cannot be reviewed by the state 
Commission on Judicial Performance or even by the State Bar Association. 
I 18. /d. at 53. 
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There is no empirical evidence that arbitrators decide cases unjustly or 
unethically. Arbitrators, however, are expected to self-monitor conflicts of 
interest, 119 even though the potential for conflicts of interest are great. Unlike 
most judges, arbitrators not only have separate business interests that may 
create conflicts, but arbitrators also have an economic self-interest in deciding 
cases in such a way as to maximize the possibility of getting return business. 120 
This latter potential conflict stems from the fact that arbitrators often 
perform their services as a career or at least as a way of supplementing their 
income from practicing law or from working in another field of expertise. An 
income-maximizing arbitrator has a strong incentive to decide the disputes she 
hears in favor of the party and/or the attorney who is most likely to need 
arbitral services again. For example, in a dispute between a large construction 
company and a one-woman tile-setting operation, the income-maximizing 
arbitrator would find a way to decide in favor of the general contractor. The 
general contractor is not only likely to be the party that insisted upon and 
drafted the arbitration clause, but also is likely to have more construction 
business and therefore to produce more arbitrable disputes. 
If the parties' contract does not provide for a method of arbitrator 
selection, a judge will select one. 121 Where the parties have simply adopted the 
rules of the AAA, and the dispute involves less than $50,000, the AAA 
automatically selects an arbitrator for them. 122 If the dispute involves more 
than $50,000, the AAA sends the parties a short list of potential arbitrators. 
The list makes no mention that a party has the right to refuse any or all of the 
choices given. 123 Upon request, only the most basic information about the 
backgrounds of the arbitrators is provided. Assuming the litigant is aware of 
this possibility, a litigant may be able to discover whether the arbitrator has 
decided other cases involving her opponent. However, the litigant cannot learn 
the results of any of these past arbitrations. 124 
The possibility that the arbitrator selection procedures of AAA and other 
such organizations help speed the processing of disputes does not offset the 
deficiencies of such procedures. Taken together, these limitations make the 
selection of the arbitrator a fairly meaningless experience. Parties seldom 
know what they are getting in an arbitrator until it is too late to change. 
119. /d. 
120. /d. 
121. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE.§ 1281.6 (West 1994). 
122. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION RULES,§ 54( a), at 19 
(1993). 
123. /d. § 13, at 9. 
124. Rueben, supra note 17, at 55. 
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Loss of The Right to a Jury Trial. Arbitration always proceeds without 
a jury. For many years, however, commentators have questioned the need for 
juries in civil matters, even in adjudication. 125 These commentators argue that 
juries lack competence to decide disputes and greatly slow the adjudication 
process. 126 Others believe that a jury, rather than a judge (or arbitrator for that 
matter), is better able to express the conscience of the community with respect 
to legal disputes. 127 Trial by jury also may have two less amorphous benefits. 
First, according to many business management theorists, groups often are 
more likely to make better quality decisions than individuals deciding alone. 128 
Vroom and Jago explain this preference for group-made decisions as stemming 
from three factors: (I) groups can bring to bear on a problem more information 
and knowledge, (2) groups can approach a problem from a greater number of 
perspectives, and (3) groups have the potential for synergy, for each member 
of the group to trigger ideas in the other members of the group. 129 
Second, as discussed below, the jury, at least for the parties involved in 
a dispute, symbolically represents society and in this way affords the party a 
sense of being heard. 130 
Power of Arbitrator to Create Evidence. Arbitrators are not bound by 
the evidence presented by the parties. Rather, the arbitrator, herself, may 
identify or create evidence. For example, an arbitrator may, without either 
party present, conduct her own, independent investigation of the facts. 131 
Similarly, an arbitrator may consult with experts who have not been called as 
witnesses by either party. 132 An arbitrator is even permitted, under California 
law, to consult with a disinterested attorney for advice regarding her conclu-
sions of law. 133 These rules are arguably part of what enables arbitrations to 
be completed more quickly than adjudications. 
The arbitrator must disclose her actions to the parties and afford them an 
opportunity to meet the evidence found. 134 However, a court will not overturn 
125. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 474. 
126. /d. 
127. See, e.g., Laura G. Dooley, Sounds of Silence on the Civil Jury, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 405 (1991). 
128. See VICTOR H. VROOM & ARTHUR G. ]AGO, THE NEW LEADERSHIP, 188, 94-10 I (Prentice Hall 
1988). In fact, in a study of 2,631 business managers conducted by Vroom and Jago, they found that 62% 
of the managers said that, if they needed a good quality decision, they would involve their subordinates in 
the decision-making process. See also JON R. KATZENBACH & DOUGLASS K. SMITH, THE WISDOM OF 
TEAMS 9 (McKinney & Co., Inc. 1993). 
129. VROOM AND ]AGO, supra note 128, at 188. 
130. See irifra note 155 and accompanying text. 
131. Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Ohm, 271 Cal. App. 2d 703, 708-09 (1969). 
132. /d.; See aLw Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal. 2d 515;..::, 5~2.-i-1,..:.;2~1~2~P.'-.i2d~23<-i3-';, 2<-i3:i.8"(1"'94"9").--------
133. Griffith Co. v. San Diego College for Women, 45 Cal. 2d 501, 506-07, 289 P.2d 476, 479 (1955). 
134. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE§ 1282.2(g) (West 1994); Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Ohm, 271 Cal. App. 
2d 703,708-09 (1969). 
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an arbitral decision because the arbitrator failed to inform the parties if the 
failure to inform and allow the parties to meet the evidence found was not 
substantially prejudicial. 135 
These powers, even as limited by a duty to inform, drastically reduce each 
party's ability to prepare for the arbitration and limit the predictability of the 
result. On the one hand, if a party cannot be certain about what evidence the 
arbitrator will consider, she cannot make informed strategy and settlement 
decisions. On the other hand, the lack of preparation may cause her presenta-
tion to be more authentic. 
Lack of Procedural Case-Combining Procedures. Neither consolida-
tion (the amalgamation of actions involving at least one common question of 
law or fact) 136 nor joinder of parties (the association of several persons or 
entities together as either plaintiffs or defendants)137 is possible under 
arbitration. Neither procedure is expressly authorized by arbitration law. 
Also, both consolidation and joinder require that all parties have arbitration 
clauses in their contracts with each other and that those arbitration clauses 
expressly allow joinder and/or consolidation. 138 
Consequently, arbitration lacks the two benefits which have been ascribed 
to consolidation and joinder: (1) allowing the system to increase its productiv-
ity, 139 and (2) allowing courts to render complete justice without impairing the 
rights of non-parties. 140 Of course, the lack of joinder and consolidation in 
arbitration does help speed cases to final determination. 
Symbolic and Systemic Loss Flaws 
Greater Potential for Bias in an Informal Setting. Delgado, Dunn, 
Brown, Lee and Hubbert (hereinafter "Delgado et al.") argue that, although 
ADR has been promoted as egalitarian, the informality of ADR actually 
increases the likelihood of decision-maker prejudice, especially where a person 
of less power in society confronts a person of greater power and the decision-
maker also is a person of greater power. 141 Delgado et al., note that the 
135. CAL. C1V. PROC. CODE§ 1282.2(g) (West 1994); Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Ohm, 271 Cal. App. 
2d 703, 708-09 (1969). 
136. FR1EDENTHALET AL., supra note 93, at 315. 
137. See MELLINKOFF, supra note 5, at 331-32. 
138. Arbitration clauses do provide for joinder. The AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS FORM 
CoNTRACT A201, is often used for or appended to construction contracts, and it expressly provides for 
joinder. 
139. FR1EDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 315. 
140. /d. at 337. 
141. Delgado et a!., supra note 17, at 1402. 
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formality of adjudication, its black robes, its deference to the flag, and its 
ritual, help to foster conformity to the American ideal of non-prejudicial 
behavior. 142 In contrast, less structured and more intimate interactions, such 
as arbitration, foster prejudice because the "human propensity to prejudge and 
make irrational categorizations" is not checked by sufficient procedural 
safeguards. 143 
Delgado et al., therefore, recommend that people of color and members 
of other traditionally disenfranchised groups would be better off opting out of 
the informality of arbitration. 144 
These contentions seem at odds with the argument of Gabel and Harris145 
that the formality of adjudication legitimizes the systematic social repression 
of those who lack power in our society. 146 Gabel and Harris believe that the 
legal system causes those who lack power to come to believe they properly 
belong "underneath" those in power and therefore to accept their powerless-
ness.147 
The formality of the legal system, however, may be used to deconstruct 
the system. Gabel and Harris also argue that the symbolic formality of 
adjudication creates a potential for subversion by those who wish to change the 
system. 148 That potential does not exist, at least to the same degree, in a 
private, informal arbitral hearing. 
Loss of the Value of Precedent Creation. Arbitration decisions have no 
effect as precedence. 149 On the one hand, as Gabel and Harris argue: 
[A]n excessive preoccupation with 'rights-consciousness' tends in the long 
run to reinforce alienation and powerlessness, because the appeal to rights 
inherently affirms that the source of social power resides in the State rather 
than in the people themselves. 150 
On the other hand, a favorable adjudication result on an issue that is 
important to a particular community, whether it is a race-based, class-based, 
status-based or occupation-based community, can be exploited and shared by 
others in the community. 151 In this way, the establishment of "rights" by 
adjudication helps link individuals together in larger movements. On an 
142. /d. at 1387-88. 
143. /d. at 1388-89. 
144. /d. at 1403. 
145. Gabel & Harris, supra note 62. 
146. /d. at 371. 
147. /d. 
148. /d. at 399-402. 
149. Brunet, supra note 17, at 13. 
150. Gabel & Harris, supra note 62, at 375. 
151. Penelope E. Bryan, Toward Deconstructing the Deconstruction of Law and Lawyers, 7 i DEN. 
U.L. REV. 161, 168 (1993). 
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individual level, the establishment of "rights" may validate the recipients' 
feelings that they have been wronged by society and encourage them to believe 
in their self value. 152 
Precedent also benefits the legal system because it affects behavior. 
Precedent informs parties and attorneys regarding the likelihood of success; as 
a result, decisions regarding the filing and settling of lawsuits are easier. This 
type of informal dispute resolution occurs with little court involvement and 
reduces court congestion. Precedent also guides behavior in the sense that 
people strive to avoid litigation altogether by behaving in accordance with the 
law.l53 
Loss of Symbolic Benefit of Public Assertion of Rights. Gabel and 
Harris argue that the public assertion of rights causes persons who lack power 
in society to accept their powerlessness and to reify their own repression. 154 
The assertion of one's feelings of having been mistreated in a public forum, 
however, may have some salutary effects. 
The mere statement in a public forum that one has been wronged arguably 
empowers the claimant, regardless of result. Adjudication takes place in 
public, in front of an authority figure, who is clothed in the garb and with the 
accoutrements of societal power. It also involves a jury, which furthers both 
a sense of careful decision-making and a sense of being heard. 155 This feeling 
of "having had one's day in court" is much less likely to occur in the very 
private, informal atmosphere of an arbitration. The arbitrator is not clothed 
with respectability and the only persons who witness the arbitral hearing are 
the disputants, their attorneys and the arbitrator. This privacy may create a 
feeling of secrecy and cover-up, so that the claimant feels she has not been 
heard at all. 
The public airing of disputes also has the potential to benefit society as 
a whole. Public trials may have a symbolic value to those who witness them; 
they are reminded of the ideals of this society and of their own opportunity for 
redress and protection from wrongdoing. 156 
Suppression of Participant Power. Arbitration suppresses participant 
power while inflating the power of the decision-maker, the arbitrator. As 
shown above, the parties' power to select their decision-maker is illusory, and 
the parties have no control over the flow of information. Most importantly, 
unlike adjudication where the parties have a right to appeal, or mediation 
152. Grillo, supra note 7, at 1566-67. 
153. Brunet, supra note 17, at 20, 23. 
154. Gabel & Harris, supra note 62, at 573. 
155. See Judith Resnick, Tiers, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 848-49 (1984). 
156. See Parker & Hagin, supra note 55, at 1912. 
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where the parties have the right to say "no," the arbitrator maintains absolute 
power. 
Arbitration is a Poor Substitute for Genuine Reform. The untoward 
emphasis on arbitration (as well as on other forms of ADR to some extent) 
seems to be an unconscious dodging of the problems with adjudication and the 
legal system as a whole. Rather than confronting these flaws and attempting 
to reform or reformulate the system, lawyers, judges and academics have 
embraced arbitration as well as other forms of ADR. In this sense, the 
connection between the rise of ADR and the increase in criticisms of the legal 
system, described above, 157 can be seen as a systemic avoidance mechanism 
which deflects the focus from the core criticisms of the legal system. 
Results Flaws 
Lack of Legal Standards. No law requires arbitrators to follow the 
applicable or controlling law, even where application of the law would 
unquestionably mandate a particular result. As the California Supreme Court 
recently held, "'[A]rbitrators are not bound to award on principles of dry law, 
but may decide on principles of equity and good conscience, and make their 
award ex aequo et bono [according to what is just and good].'"158 
As a result, parties to an arbitration may be bound by an award "reached 
by paths neither marked nor traceable .... "159 
As Jane Kom argues, the absence of legal guidelines may allow for more 
flexible, less rule-defined decision-making. 160 However, the absence of legal 
guidelines greatly inhibits the predictability of arbitration and therefore makes 
settlement of disputes very difficult. It probably also increases the likelihood 
of arbitral decisions influenced by racial, class or gender prejudices, 161 or by 
the arbitrator's economic self-interest. 162 
Lack of Review of Arbitral Results. Three reasons account for the 
minimal review given to arbitral awards. 
First, there is no written record of an arbitration. The lack of a record 
insulates the arbitration decision from meaningful review. 163 
157. See supra notes 54- 69 and accompanying text. 
158. Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal. 4th I, II. 832 P.2d 899, 904 (1992) quoting Muldrow v. 
Norris, 2 Cal. 74, 77 (1852). 
159. /d. 
160. Kom, supra note 15, at 102. 
--------t61. See Delgado et al., supra note 17, at 1402. 
162. See Rueben, supra note 17, at 53. 
163. See Moriarty v. Carlson, 184 Cal. App. 2d 51, 54 (1960) (if there is no record for review, 
findings of arbitrator are presumed correct). 
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Second, an arbitrator has no duty to explain her decision. 164 In fact, AAA 
tells its arbitrators that they should not explain the reasons for their decision so 
as to insulate their awards from review. Therefore, arbitrators regularly refuse 
to explain or justify their decisions. 165 
Third, in the majority of jurisdictions, an appellate court may review an 
arbitral decision only if the award or the arbitration involved fraud, corruption 
or undue means. 166 Appellate courts do not review the form and sufficiency 
of the evidence, nor the credibility and good faith of the parties and witnesses 
nor the arbitrator's conclusions of fact. 167 Neither may appellate courts review 
the arbitrator's interpretation of a contract, 168 nor her conclusions of law or 
application of law to fact. 169 Even an egregious error of law is not 
reviewable. 170 
Without the time and expense of appeal, and because arbitrators are not 
concerned by the possibility of review, arbitrations proceed to decision more 
cheaply and rapidly. On the other hand, the lack of control over the results of 
arbitrations increase the likelihood of results influenced by bias or by the 
arbitrator's own economic self-interest because the arbitrator knows she cannot 
be overruled. The unavailability of appeal also reduces predictability in 
arbitral results and the attendant benefits of predictability, such as assisting 
parties in making decisions regarding the filing and settling of lawsuits. 
Possibility of Lesser Accuracy. Edward Brunet argues that an important 
goal of any dispute resolution process is "accurate" results. 171 However, 
deficiencies in all forms of ADR cause all forms of ADR to be less "accurate" 
than adjudication. 172 According to Brunet, the lack of effective discovery in 
ADR causes a loss of information, and that information "is essential to quality 
decision making."173 Furthermore, the lack of reasoned statements of decision 
in ADR also inhibits accuracy. 174 
Quality dispute resolution, according to Brunet, also requires a following 
of the principles of substantive law because the substantive law establishes 
164. Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal.2d 515, 522,212 P.2d 233,239 (1949). 
165. Rau, supra note 15, at 2028 n.85. 
166. Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal.4th I, 21-22, 832 P.2d 899, 911 (1992). 
167. /d. 
168. Wetsel v. Garibaldi, 159 Cal. App. 2d 4, 12 (1958). 
169. Moncharsh, 3 Cal.4th at 23, 832 P.2d at 912. 
170. See, e.g., Woodard v. Southern Cal. Permanente Medical Group, 171 Cal. App. 3d 656, 662 
( 1985). A minority of jurisdictions do permit review of such errors. See infra note 192 and accompanying 
text. 
171. Brunet, supra note 17, at 15. 
172. /d. at 54-55. 
173. /d. at 33-34. 
174. /d. at 43. 
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norms for decision-making. 175 He argues that the lack of legal standards for 
decision-making may prevent the ADR decision-maker from remaining 
impartial. 176 
Other factors, not discussed by Brunet, which may reduce the accuracy 
of arbitration include the lack of arbitrator ethics or review, the lack of witness 
oaths, and the lack of required qualifications to be an arbitrator. The absence 
of these factors opens up possibilities of abuse and therefore of inaccuracy. 
Even if one does not quite share Brunet's faith in identifying "quality" in 
decision making or his implicit belief that a "truth" can exist or be found in a 
dispute, 177 his assertion that decisions can be better informed through 
discovery, and less biased through the use of precedent to set guiding norms, 
make sense. 
The Relationship Between the Asserted Deficiencies of Arbitration and the 
Asserted Benefits of Arbitration 
What is ironic about the deficiencies of arbitration described above is that 
they stem, in large part, from the benefits of arbitration. Each asserted benefit 
of arbitration resonates in the deficiencies such that the deficiencies appear 
almost inherent in the institution of arbitration. 
For example, to preserve the benefits of greater speed and lower cost, 
arbitration cannot include a formal pleading requirement, discovery or jury 
trials. In fact, the lack of pleading and discovery are cited both as benefits of 
arbitration and as explanations for the greater speed and lower cost of 
arbitration. 178 
Pleading, discovery and juries usually require extensive involvement by 
attorneys, and both pleading and discovery involve the risk of attorney abuse. 
Pleading and discovery also require a decision-maker to have legal expertise, 
a requirement which conflicts with an asserted benefit of arbitration, the ability 
to use expert decision-makers. 
The choice to avoid applying the rules of evidence in arbitration stems 
from the same three asserted benefits of arbitration. Speed would be decreased 
and cost would be increased by a system that requires the decision-maker to 
evaluate evidentiary objections. More importantly, the desire for expert 
decision-makers, who often are non-lawyers, limits the possibility of applying 
the rules of evidence. 
175. /d. at 25. 
176. id. at 26. 
177. Brunet notes the subjectivity of the tem1"quality." /d. at 8. Nevertheless, Brunet operates under 
an assumption that he can define "quality" and apply it to adjudication and ADR. 
178. Rau, supra note 15, at 2027-28. 
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The relationship between the lack of an oath requirement and of ready 
sanctions for perjury, on the one hand, and the asserted benefits of arbitration, 
on the other hand, is less clear. Perhaps these deficiencies can be linked to the 
greater informality of arbitration which stems, in turn, from the speed and cost 
considerations. Further, the fact that an expert, rather than a judge, is involved 
greatly inhibits the use of oaths and sanctions for perjury. 
Deficiencies in arbitrator selection can be directly tied to the twin goals 
of greater speed and lower cost. Evidence of the connection between the 
desire for speed and low cost and the deficiencies in selection is demonstrated 
by the AAA's policy of selecting the arbitrator for the parties as part of its 
"expedited procedures.'' 179 In other words, greater speed requires less 
participant involvement in the arbitrator selection process. Moreover, the 
expense required for full arbitrator background disclosure, for reviews of 
arbitrator competency and for administration of arbitrator ethical standards 
surely would be passed on to the consumers of arbitral services in the form of 
greater fees. 
The use of "expert" decision-makers may have played a role in conferring 
power to arbitrators to conduct their own independent investigations. This 
power may derive from a belief that arbitrators, unlike judges in adjudication, 
are likely either to need or to seek such help. Allowing arbitrators to conduct 
their own, independent investigations also could stem from the desire for 
greater informality in arbitration (which has both speed and cost ramifications). 
The inability to consolidate cases or to join parties results from the private 
nature of arbitration agreements. Such agreements, like all contractual 
promises, bind only the parties involved and only to the extent specified 
therein. 
The privacy and informality of arbitration, the desire for flexible arbitral 
decisions and the use of "expert" (non-lawyer) decision-makers combine to 
prevent arbitral decisions from having effect as precedents and cause a loss of 
the benefits that attend the creation of precedent. Likewise, the use of "expert" 
decision-makers who are not attorneys or judges and the desire for flexibility 
necessarily include a trade-off in the arbitrator's ignorance of legal doctrine 
andin the legal system's inability to review arbitral decisions. 
The increased possibility of arbitrator prejudice, the dis-empowerment of 
the participants and the potential for inaccuracy all stem from combinations of 
the deficiencies and therefore arise out of the asserted benefits of arbitration. 
For example, the greater potential for inaccuracy in arbitration is a result of the 
lack of discovery and pleadings and the failure to require the application of 
179. AAA FoRM, supra note 90, §§53-57. 
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legal doctrines. These deficiencies, as shown above, spring from the asserted 
benefits of arbitration. 
Conclusions Regarding the Deficiencies in Arbitration 
Two overarching points can be made regarding the deficiencies in 
arbitration. First, the proponents who trumpet arbitration have ignored some 
very troubling deficiencies in arbitration. Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, the deficiencies in arbitration all come directly from the benefits 
of arbitration. This latter fact makes reform of arbitration very challenging. 
N. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR THE DEFICIENCIES IN ARBITRATION 
Solutions for deficiencies in arbitration potentially lie in two separate 
spheres. Both the legislatures and courts have the power to regulate the 
arbitration process. Parties, however, need not wait for either governmental 
branch to act; parties may try to address arbitration deficiencies themselves by 
drafting their arbitration agreements to address the deficiencies. 180 
This section examines how arbitration law might be changed, either by 
statute, case law or by the parties' arbitration agreement. As explained in Part 
V, some of the deficiencies in arbitration cannot be fixed. For example, the 
symbolic or systemic flaws cannot really be addressed by reforms in 
arbitration. Also, solutions that have no genuine possibility of occurring 
because they cannot, as a practical matter, be grafted onto arbitration, are not 
addressed in this section. This section therefore does not address adding jury 
trials to arbitration, allowing arbitrations to have precedential effect or making 
arbitrations into public hearings. 
Process Solutions 
Claim Disclosure Solutions 
It would not be particularly hard to require greater pleading formality in 
arbitration. Parties could be required to disclose their theories of liability and 
defense. Likewise, modern discovery procedures could be added to arbitration. 
Under California law, for example, if the arbitration agreement expressly 
adopts Code of Civil Procedure § 1283.05, the parties are permitted to conduct 
180. Any suggestion that procedures or provisions be created by the parties' arbitration agreement 
must take into account the concern of those who regularly draft contracts, that a party who 
proposes a very detailed arbitration clause may be forced to trade off "deal points" to obtain assent to a 
detailed arbitration clause. A party who proposes a detailed arbitration clause also may be seen as 
introducing an undesirable adversarial emphasis into the contract negotiations. Finally, some parties may 
want to take advantage of the slow speed and expense of adjudication to exploit their greater economic 
wherewithal. 
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discovery, subject to the limitation that approval be obtained from the 
arbitrator to take depositions. 181 
California law also provides that, if the amount of money in dispute 
exceeds $50,000, and the arbitrator is properly informed of the request, either 
party may obtain a list of the other party's percipient and expert witnesses and 
the documents the other party intends to introduce. 182 There is no reason that 
such disclosure could not be required in all cases. 
Edward Brunet recommends that any solution in this area incorporate 
greater judicial involvement to help ensure, through the court's contempt 
powers, that the disputants are forthcoming in sharing information with each 
other. 183 
Evidentiary Control 
Similarly, the parties, legislatures or courts could require, in whole or 
part, the application of the rules of evidence in arbitration. California law only 
provides that the "rules of evidence ... need not be observed,"184 suggesting 
at least the possibility that the parties can contractually bind themselves and the 
arbitrator to following the rules of evidence. 
Witness Honesty 
California arbitration law also permits a party, by request, to require that 
the witnesses testify under oath. 185 There is no reason that such an oath should 
not always be included. As I explain below, enforcement of any oath, 
however, is much more difficult. 186 
Selection and Qualifications of the Arbitrator 
The parties themselves or the legislature could establish minimum 
qualifications which an arbitrator must possess. It is even possible to require 
arbitrators to undergo special training, testing and licensing procedures. The 
parties or the legislature can require the arbitrator to swear an oath and the 
legislature could establish professional obligations for all those who hold 
themselves out as arbitrators, while arbitrator organizations could adopt ethical 
guidelines. 
181. CAL. Ov. PRoc. CODE§§ 1283.1, 1283.05(e) (West 1982). No such provision is included in the 
Uniform Arbitration Act which has been adopted, by the most recent count, in 35 states. Table of 
Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted, UNIF. ARBITRATION Acr, 7 U.L.A. I (Supp. 1994). 
182. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE§ 1282.2(a)(2) (West 1982). Copies of such documents must be made 
available to the other party for inspection. /d. 
183. Brunet, supra note 17, at 53-54. 
184. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE§ 1282.2(d) (West 1982). 
185. !d. 
186. See infra note 205 and accompanying text. 
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Arbitrator's Power To Create Evidence 
The legislature and the parties to an arbitration agreement also have the 
ability to curb or even eliminate the arbitrator's power to conduct her own 
investigation and to consult with experts of her own choosing. California, as 
noted above, requires the arbitrator to inform the parties of such activities and 
to allow them to address whatever she learns on her own. 187 It would only be 
a small step to prohibit such activity altogether. 
Result Solutions 
Lack of Legal Standards 
Arbitration law or the parties' arbitration agreement can require the 
arbitrator to follow the applicable law. In dicta, at least one California court 
has suggested that the parties can make a binding agreement that the arbitrator 
must follow the law. 188 
Lack of Review 
First, law or the parties' arbitration agreement may require the arbitration 
be stenographically recorded, and the arbitrator may be required to issue a 
detailed statement of the decision. Second, at least theoretically, an arbitration 
agreement can provide for a right of appeal. In Kauffman v. Shearson Hayden 
Stone, Inc.,189 the parties' arbitration agreement provided for appellate review 
of the arbitrator's decision. 190 Kauffman did not address the propriety of such 
a clause, but at least the court did not indicate that such a clause was improper. 
Edward Brunet advocates a lesser degree of review; he proposes that a 
brief form of judicial scrutiny be included before the matter is heard and, 
again, after the matter has been decided, when the court is in the process of 
affirming the arbitral award. 191 As a student note explains, some of the state 
courts have experimented with varying standards of limited appellate review 
such as "gross legal error," "manifest disregard of the law," and "error on the 
face" of the award. 192 
187. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 1282.2 (West 1982); Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Ohm, 271 Cal. App. 
2d 703,708-709 (1969). Ohm, however,limits this rule to situations where the failure to inform the parties 
prejudices the other party. /d. 
188. Harris v. Havennr, 169 Cal. App. 2d 531,534 (1959). 
189. 128 Cal. App. 3d 809 (1982). 
190. /d.at811. 
191. Brunet, supra note 17, at 53. 
192. Cheryl Aptowitzer, Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards- Courts May Review and 
Vacate an Arbitration Award Where an Arbitration Commits Gross, Unmistakable, or Not Reasonably 
Debatable Errors of Law or Where the Arbitration Manifestly Disregards the Law and the Result is Unjust-
1994] THE COLLAPSE OF ARBITRATION 29 
V. WHY ARBITRATION MUST COLLAPSE 
This addresses the efficacy of the proposed solutions. First, the 
deficiencies that cannot be addressed by refonn of arbitration are identified. 
Second, the proposed refonns themselves are evaluated and some of the 
difficulties that might arise in implementing the refonns are explained. 
Finally, I argue that the refonn of arbitration will destroy its efficacy. 
Inability to Address All the Deficiencies of Arbitration 
Any refonn of arbitration simply cannot address all of its deficiencies. 
Arbitration is not susceptible to the addition of certain procedural refonns, 
such as adding jury trials or allowing consolidation and joinder. Arbitration 
also cannot really be refonned in such a way as to meaningfully redress its 
symbolic and systemic flaws. 
Unremediable Process Flaws 
As a practical matter, it probably would be impossible to establish a jury 
trial system for arbitrations. The legal system has the power to compel 
potential jurors, at least those who lack one of the excuses recognized by the 
jurisdiction, to serve through the threat of sanctions. 193 No such power could 
be conferred on private dispute resolution. Moreover, the administration of a 
jury system would be hopelessly complicated. 
In adjudication, the jury usually decides the questions of fact and the 
judge decides the questions of law. 194 How such a division might work for an 
arbitration is unfathomable. Parties chose arbitration because, among other 
things, they desire a decision-maker who has special expertise. If a jury, rather 
than the arbitrator, were deciding the factual issues, there no longer would be 
a need for an arbitrator as opposed to a judge. Also, the arbitrator, under such 
a scenario, would be relegated to deciding legal issues, a task for which she 
may not be qualified. 
For a very different reason, the case combining procedures of consolida-
tion and joinder cannot be grafted onto arbitration. Binding arbitration is 
mostly the exclusive realm of contract law; the parties must agree that their 
dispute(s) will be resolved by arbitration. The procedures of joinder and 
consolidation, of course, necessarily require that the person who is joined or 
the case that is consolidated be subject to the jurisdiction of the combining 
Perini Corp. v. Great Bay Hotel and Casino Inc., 129 N.J. 479,610 A.2d 364 (1992}, 24 SETON HALLL. 
REV. 998 (1993). 
193. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, § ll.IO, at 523. 
194. /d. § 11.2, at 478. 
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court. 195 In arbitration, jurisdiction is conferred by the parties' arbitration 
agreement. There is no way to assure that parties whose joinder or consolida-
tion may be sought also are bound to contractual arbitration clauses, nor is 
there any guarantee that such clauses also would contain a provision allowing 
joinder or consolidation. 
Unremediable Symbolic or Systemic Flaws 
An arbitrator's greater potential for bias also cannot be remedied. The 
potential for bias, as Delgado et al. argue, stems from the informality of 
arbitration and therefore is endemic to the nature of arbitration. 196 Likewise, 
by its very nature, arbitration cannot remedy the loss of creating precedent or 
create the personal gains from the public airing of grievances. While the 
reforms discussed above can help address some of the deficiencies in 
arbitration that cause the suppression of participant power and the creation of 
disproportionate arbitrator power, as discussed below, these power issues are 
inherent in any form of binding arbitration and cannot be remedied without 
destroying the asserted benefits of arbitration. 
The possibility that arbitration is a convenient distraction from the 
problems with adjudication also cannot be addr~ssed by reforming arbitration. 
Rather, this problem requires the members of the legal system and society to 
confront the problems of adjudication by questioning the very essence of the 
legal system. 
Potential Complexities in Individual Solutions 
On their face, the solutions suggested above appear relatively straightfor-
ward and easy to implement; in fact, they may be hopelessly complicated, and 
they would create as many problems as they would solve. 
Claim Disclosure Solutions 
Both the pleading and discovery solutions raise a number of important 
and intricate sub-issues. Reform of arbitration pleading would require 
assessment of which aspects of modern pleading law to incorporate. Most 
jurisdictions require some form of notice or fact pleading. 197 However, if a 
claim is not entirely based on legal doctrine, which is permissible under 
arbitration law, 198 the form of such notice is problematic. The addition of 
discovery to arbitration raises an even greater number of complications. On 
195. /d. § 6.5, at 342. 
196. See supra notes 141-144 and accompanying text. 
197. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, § 5.4, at 244. 
198. Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal. 4th I, II , 832 P.2d 899,904 (1992). 
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the one hand, there is a desire to limit the amount of discovery to preserve the 
speed and lower cost advantages for which arbitration is lauded. This 
inclination is manifested in California's deposition limitations. 199 On the other 
hand, the need for information in any particular case depends on a number of 
factors that any rigid limitation could not consider. The factors include: the 
complexity of the issues in the case, the number of issues, how cooperative the 
parties and their attorneys are, the difficulty of finding witnesses, the extent of 
the need for expert testimony and the nature of the expertise needed, the 
economic resources of the parties, the amount of money at stake in the dispute, 
and the significance of the issues at stake to the parties. It is widely perceived 
that discovery is regularly abused in adjudication;200 the absence of a successful 
solution to this problem for adjudication suggests the difficulty of establishing 
optimal limitations on discovery in any form of dispute resolution. 
Enforcement of discovery rights, once established, presents equally 
perplexing problems. California law provides that, if discovery is permitted, 
the arbitrator has the same powers with respect to enforcement as a judge in a 
superior court action.201 Such powers seem fairly necessary to give discovery 
rights any genuine meaning. Those powers, however, include the ability to 
punish "abuse" (which includes non-compliance and over-use) by: (1) 
monetary sanctions (charging the abuser the other party's expenses in 
consequence of the abuse); (2) issue sanctions (deciding an issue adversely to 
the abuser); (3) evidence sanctions (preventing the abuser from introducing 
evidence that was the subject of an abuse); (4) terminating sanction (adversely 
deciding an entire lawsuit or claim against the abuser); and/or (5) contempt 
sanctions (treating abuse as a form of contempt).202 
These powers raise troubling questions regarding the capacity of all 
arbitrators to understand and apply discovery law, the ability to create some 
form of immediate appellate court review, such as mandamus, the awkward-
ness of tailoring sanctions to particular issues given the informality in the 
pleadings, and the difficulty of conferring contempt power on an arbitrator. 
Even if contempt power could be conferred on an arbitrator, conferring such 
a power raises other important questions.203 
199. Depositions are allowed in California arbitrations only upon application to the arbitrator and only 
if the arbitrator permits them. CAL. Clv. PRoc. CODE § 1283.05(e) (West 1982). 
200. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, § 7 .18, at 422. 
201. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE§ 1283.05(b), (c) (West 1982). 
202. CAL. Clv. PRoc. CODE§ 2023 (West 1982). 
203. For example, a judge can order that a person be jailed for contempt. DAN B. DOBBS, LAw OF 
REMEDIES§ 2.8(1), at 130 (2d ed.). Could and should an arbitrator be given the power to jail persons she 
holds in contempt? How can an arbitrator be given such power? 
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Evidentiary Control 
Problems also confound the application of evidence law in arbitrations. 
First, the capacity of arbitrators to develop sufficient fluency with the nuances 
of evidence law seems questionable. Second, time and informality constraints 
make including the entire body of evidence law in arbitration undesirable, yet 
it is difficult to determine which aspects to include or exclude. Most 
importantly, we assume that a judge who hears inadmissible evidence can 
ignore its possibly prejudicial effect because of her experience, her familiarity 
with evidence law, her awareness of the possibility of appellate review of any 
biased decision, and her required professional ethics. 204 With an arbitrator, 
these controlling factors either may be less powerful or non-existent. The 
arbitrator's ability to avoid being prejudiced by improper evidence is entirely 
dependent on the arbitrator's educationaland employment background, life 
experience and values. 
Witness Honesty 
The inclusion of an oath requirement raises similar enforcement issues as 
well as other, more serious concerns. In adjudication, perjury exists as the 
threat that, at least theoretically, inhibits witness dishonesty. However, the 
mechanisms for punishing perjury committed in arbitration are not readily 
apparent; it is likely that the arbitrator herself would have to testify in any 
perjury hearing. 
Moreover, the informality of arbitration itself may encourage dishonesty 
in much the same way that the informality of arbitration fosters bias. Other 
forms of socially desirable behavior other than egalitarianism, such as 
truthfulness may also be less likely to occur in arbitration than in adjudication, 
where the formality, ritual and the positioning of the judge (above everyone) 
may create pressure to act honestly. 205 At the very least, a judge is a much 
more imposing figure, by her positioning, dress and reputation than an 
arbitrator, who wears business clothes, sits across the table from the witness 
and has no pre-existing cultural image. Fear of punishment for perjury is 
therefore much more likely in adjudication than in arbitration. 
Selection and Qualifications of the Arbitrator 
The proposed solutions to the problems of selection and qualifications of 
arbitrators also are more complicated than they appear at first glance. 
204. See generally McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note I 04, § 60, at 238. 
205. Social psychologists believe that people change their behavior to conform to what is expected 
of them, especially in very formal settings. Delgado et al., supra note 17, at 1387-88. 
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Deciding who is qualified to arbitrate raises questions regarding what personal 
qualities, professional experiences and educational backgrounds might be 
predictive of skillful dispute decision-making. Because arbitration occurs 
privately, and therefore cannot be effectively studied, the possibility of 
empirically testing any set of proposed qualifications does not exist. Even if 
arbitration were not private, decision-making skill simply may be too 
subjective a criterion to consider. 
Even a carefully crafted set of ethical standards would only be of limited 
help. The privacy of arbitrations make enforcement of such standards nearly 
impossible. To avoid sanctions for violating any such standards, an arbitrator 
who wishes to maximize the likelihood of return business needs only one, 
significant disputed fact on which she can claim to have based her decision. 
Arbitrators therefore can insulate themselves from criticism or punishment for 
misbehavior. This problem is compounded by the proposal to establish 
arbitrator qualifications. If the pool of arbitrators is too limited, even the best 
set of ethical standards cannot prevent arbitrators from being selected to decide 
disputes involving parties who have appeared before them on prior occasions, 
and who will appear before them in the future. 
Results Solutions 
Requiring arbitrators to follow the law and subjecting arbitral decisions 
to appellate review also will be difficult to implement. A requirement that 
arbitrators follow the law is only meaningful if appellate review exists to verify 
that the arbitrator followed the law. Moreover, for appellate rights to be 
effective, the decision-maker must posses subs~tiallegal sophistication and 
the proceedings must be stenographically or audio-visually recorded. The 
existing, already-burdened appellate system would have to be adapted to 
handle arbitral appeals. Standards of review could vary from the adjudication 
standards, as they presently do,206 or courts could treat arbitration appeals just 
like they treat adjudication appeals. Either possibility raises additional 
problems. 
The current standards of review for arbitration require that the error fit 
into a narrow and, at the same time, indeterminate definition (i.e., "gross 
error," "error on the face of the award," "manifest disregard of the law");207 as 
a result, appellate success is unpredictable and haphazard. On the other hand, 
the adjudication standards of review are tailored to the adjudication form of 
decision-making (which includes juries as fact-finders, for example, which is 
206. See Aptowitzer, supra note 192, at 1001. 
207. /d. at 1001-03. 
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not possible in arbitration) and therefore may prove difficult to apply to 
private, closed, arbitrator-decided arbitration results. 
The Conflict Between the Solutions for Arbitration Deficiencies and the 
Nature of Arbitration 
Even if arbitration's problems could be solved and we were to decide that 
we can live with our inability to solve some of the deficiencies of arbitration, 
arbitration would not survive the refonn process. Regarding the proposal that 
review of arbitration be expanded, the California Supreme Court noted in 
Moncharsh, "[e]xpanding the availability of judicial review of such decisions 
'would tend to deprive the parties to the arbitration agreement of the very 
advantages th~ process is intended to produce."'208 
This conclusion stemmed from the court's perception that any change to 
arbitration that either incorporates the legal system or its procedures necessar-
ily conflicts with the parties' desire to bypass that system.209 Close examina-
tion of the proposed solutions discussed above reveals that the proposed 
changes would only transfonn arbitration into a poorer, less attractive fonn of 
adjudication while virtually eliminating the asserted benefits of arbitration. 
The creation of discovery rights, pleading rights, evidentiary objections 
and an obligation to follow the law would eliminate the possibility in most, if 
not all, cases of using decision-makers who may not be trained in the law but 
who possess technical expertise in the industry, trade or profession in dispute. 
Legal issues require decision-makers who possess training, knowledge and 
skill in legal analysis. Indeed, it seems likely that any suggested list of 
arbitrator qualifications would include legal expertise. Further, the need for 
decision-makers with legal expertise will severely limit the number of 
available arbitrators. Any reduction in the supply of available decision-makers 
has at least the potential to impact the speed of decision-making. 
Privacy also would have to be sacrificed in the name of refonn, at least 
to the extent that the arbitral decisions could be appealed by the non-prevailing 
party. The current, strict limits on appellate review almost certainly serve to 
discourage appeal; an expansion of the grounds for appeal necessarily would 
increase the likelihood of such appeal. 
Moreover, the addition of adjudication procedures will substantially 
reduce the time and cost savings of arbitration. Pleading motion practice, 
discovery and discovery motion practice, evidentiary objections and rulings, 
even oath requirements and enforcement of oaths all consume substantial time 
208. Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal. 4th I, 10 (1992). 
209. /d. 
1994] THE COLLAPSE OF ARBITRATION 35 
and increase attorney fees. Likewise, any requirement that the proceedings be 
recorded and other efforts to create an appellate record, such as detailed 
statements of decision, will also prolong the arbitration process and increase 
the cost of arbitration. In arbitration, the increase in cost by all of these 
procedures is magnified by the fact that the parties must pay for the arbitrator's 
time. Legal accuracy by the arbitrator in all of these areas (discovery, 
pleading, evidence, substantive law) will require substantial effort and time. 
Consequently, the time and cost savings that arguably justify arbitration in the 
first place would be minimized and probably lost altogether. 
Finally, if the arbitrator is required to follow the law she loses the 
flexibility to make non-traditional and creative decisions. Instead of making 
a relationship-preserving decision, she is forced to make a decision that 
categorizes the participants into winners and losers because the law she must 
apply almost always requires such decisions. 
In short, arbitration must be fixed, yet it cannot be fixed and still survive. 
Arbitration left unchanged is intolerably flawed; arbitration modified loses the 
qualities that make it attractive. Accordingly, arbitration cannot survive as an 
important form of dispute resolution. 
CONCLUSION 
In addition to having revealed the intractable flaws of arbitration, I hope 
this article has offered some insight into how the legal system has defined its 
own problems and then confined the solutions. Arbitration and adjudication 
are presented as a matched set of either-or choices, yet neither is particularly 
attractive on its own, and both can be "reformed" only through a process of 
becoming more like the other. The question posed by this apparent Catch-22 
becomes troubling. If adjudication is flawed and arbitration should neither be 
kept the same nor reformed, what can we do? 
An answer may lie within the supernova analogy with which I began this 
article. Scientists theorize that, after a supernova has collapsed into a neutron 
star, the debris spreads into space and may be reformulated, with other 
ingredients, into a new star.210 A similar possibility exists in the collapse of 
arbitration. This opportunity could be a chance to use what we have learned 
from arbitration to devise a new and better form of ADR. Better yet, the 
collapse of arbitration affords us a chance to examine the legal system in ways 
similar to those expressed herein and to contemplate either meaningful reform 
210. LIGHTMAN, supra note I, at 46. 
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of that system or to contemplate how to reenginee.-211 a legal system that is 
more responsive to its users. 
The benefits asserted for arbitration might be incorporated in either a 
reform or a reengineering of the legal system. Accordingly, any such reform 
or reengineering should attempt to incorporate: greater accessibility through 
reduced cost, speedy resolution of disputes, less rigid adherence to legal 
doctrine where such adherence conflicts with justice and/or the interests of the 
parties, an ability to identify and benefit from expert decision-makers, and the 
ability to fashion decisions that do not polarize the parties into winners and 
losers. At the same time, such reform or reengineering should try to avoid the 
deficiencies outlined in this article. 
The collapse of arbitration presents an opportunity that should not be 
missed. 
211. Reengineering is the "fundamental rethinking and the radical redesign of ... processes to achieve 
dramatic improvements in critical ... measures of performance .... " MICHAEL HAMMER & JAMES 
CHAMPY, REENGINEERING THE CORPORATION: A MANIFESTO FOR BUSINESS REVOLUTION, 32 (Harper 
Business 1993). Although Hammer and Champy's ideas were conceived for businesses interested in 
changing themselves, they also have meaning for change in the legal system. A fundamental rethinking 
about how the legal system does its business is in order. 
